

IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR EARLY WARNING

SYNTHESIS REPORT

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INITIATIVE FOR PEACEBUILDING
EARLY WARNING



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The Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action (IfP-EW) is a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission. It draws on the expertise of 10 members with offices across the EU and in conflict-affected countries. It aims to develop and harness international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure that all stakeholders, including EU institutions, can access strong, independent, locally derived analysis in order to facilitate better informed and more evidence-based policy and programming decisions.

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the European Union (EU) external action structures make the transition from their pre- to post-Lisbon reality, there is a window of opportunity to strengthen elements of the Early Warning (EW) and Early Response (ER) conflict prevention architecture and to address some of the institutional obstacles to promote more effective and timely conflict prevention actions.

One of the most notable observations from this study is the lack of consensus on a working definition of early warning and response within the EU institutional context. Perceptions of EW and conflict prevention vary from a purely military view to a development approach, which becomes evident in the lack of coherence amongst the various institutional actors involved in EW.

The challenge for the EU is to design an early warning system that matches the goal of assisting decision making and action on early responses to emerging conflicts. Too much focus on a “perfect” warning system may lead actors to disregard the most important element: the response. The EU's broad range of instruments and extended network of actors both within EU institutions and through Member States offers an opportunity for action of which few other international actors can boast, yet deploying and exploiting that capacity has remained elusive in the field of early responses to conflicts across the world. At the same time, the EU's ability to contribute to and support multilateral and Member-State initiatives is great.

The Lisbon Treaty has provided the strongest mandate yet for EU institutions to engage with conflict prevention. However, the corresponding ambition and political leadership for conflict prevention has not been evident. Whilst conflict prevention languishes behind crisis management as an EU external action priority, it will be difficult to establish the same strength of capacity and action. The eight case studies and mapping exercises that form the backbone of this research cluster have produced new insights into the day-to-day working of EU actors and instruments on early warning and responses for conflict prevention. Nevertheless, the findings represent only the symptoms of the condition afflicting early EU action on conflict prevention. The overarching findings reveal a policy without direction and commitment without ambition. To overcome this, Member States, together with the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, need to define and communicate their vision for how the EU will engage with early warning and early responses in a way that matches the commitments and the capacity of the EU to play a role in preventing and reducing the impact of violent conflicts.

2. INTRODUCTION

In response to high profile failures of the international community to intervene¹ and the devastating consequences of the conflicts that have followed, conflict prevention has moved up the ladder of international priorities. Preventive action has slowly emerged as a legitimate and desirable component of international action to reduce the impact of violence in countries affected by deeply-rooted conflicts. Moreover, preventive action can set the scene for more durable peace and improved conditions for development, which in an age of interdependence carries with it a significant self-interested motivation for action².

Conflict prevention can take on many forms, and can be broadly divided into two types of prevention: long-term structural conflict prevention, which tackles the underlying societal structures and political institutions that contribute to sustained conflict,³ and early preventive interventions that aim to stop the immediate escalation or outbreak of violent conflict in the short term. The focus of this paper is the implementation of swift and efficient EU preventive actions based on early warnings and the unique challenges posed by early interventions, with particular reference to the EU's capacity to act.

In the past decade, the EU has signalled its intention to break with 'conventional foreign policy'⁴ and, as such, has committed itself to pursuing conflict prevention as one of its main priorities for external action. However, whilst the EU's repeated commitments are welcome for the political statement they convey, this welcome comes with a caveat. In order for the EU to play a truly effective international role in conflict prevention, there must be the capacity and the will to meet those commitments in practice, not just in principle. The aim of this research is to support EU institutions in addressing early warning and early responses for conflict prevention during this post-Lisbon external action transition period by closing the "warning-response gap", and by 'better link[ing] early warning to effective and timely response to prevent conflict'⁵.

The starting point for the discussion of the EU's capacity to implement early responses to prevent conflict based on warnings must be approached from a clear understanding of its mandate for such action. The following documents establish the scope of the EU's commitments in this area and constitute the reference points against which its capacity for action should be measured.

1 For example in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2003-2004).

2 J. Brante, C. de Franco, C. Meyer and F. Otto (2011). *Worse, Not better? Reinvigorating early warning for conflict prevention in the post-Lisbon European Union*. Egmont Paper.

3 Also referred to as conflict transformation. See J. P. Lederach (2003). *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. Intercourse, PA: Good Books.

4 J. Brante, C. de Franco, C. Meyer and F. Otto (2011). *Op. cit.*

5 Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning (IfP-EW) website (2010). 'Cluster description: Improving Institutional Capacity for Early Warning', accessed 2nd September 2011. Available at <http://www.ifp-ew.eu/capacity.php>

2001	Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention
2001	Presidency Conclusions: EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (Göteborg Programme)
2002	Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council: Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts
2003	European Security Strategy ⁶
2007	Commission Communication: Towards an EU response to Situations of Fragility: Engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and peace
2007	Council Conclusions on Security and Development
2007	Council Conclusions on an EU response to Situations of Fragility
2008	Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
2009	The Treaty of Lisbon ⁷
2011	Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention

In order to assess the EU's capacity, the research partners have examined the challenges of the EU decision-making context and the decision-making process between early warning and early action; the pre-Lisbon architecture for early warning and responses within the Council of the EU and the European Commission; the realities of the EU's EW-ER capabilities through the implementation of eight country case studies⁸; and carried out a post-Lisbon mapping update of EU institutions working on EW-ER at this point in time (*see List of Reports for more details*).

The eight case studies produced tangible examples of how EU bodies and instruments performed in practice, and identified specific areas where EW-ER procedures could be strengthened. The reports on the decision-making process and the mappings of Commission and Council bodies derived valuable observations on the functioning of EW-ER within EU institutions in the pre-Lisbon period and generated key findings from which to assess the post-Lisbon EU architecture. Together, these inputs have shaped the analysis of the EU's capacity for early warning and early responses for conflict prevention as well as informing the recommendations for good practices going forward.

6 The Strategy states that 'conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early' and 'early identification and understanding of risk factors increases the chances of timely and effective action to address the underlying causes of conflict'. Council of the EU (2003). *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*. Brussels. Available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

7 Article 21.2.C states that '[T]he Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to [...] preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security'. European Union (2007). 'The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty Establishing the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community', Official Journal of the European Union 2007/C 306/01. Lisbon.

8 The eight country case studies were conducted in Armenia, Bolivia, Colombia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Sri Lanka, the Sudans, and Venezuela.

3. THE PRE-LISBON ARCHITECTURE⁹

The pre-Lisbon EU early warning architecture was largely located in two institutions: the Council of the EU and the European Commission. Each institution had developed various tools and bodies to contribute to the EU's early warning and early response capacity, yet the capacity for timely, coordinated and effective warnings and responses was hampered by a number of factors.

The overarching challenge to the effective functioning of EW and ER was that there was **no common EU-wide understanding of early warning and early response for conflict prevention**. Without at least a working definition of early warnings and early responses and what they entailed in the EU context, it was left to individuals and departments to interpret EW and ER, resulting in plethora of activities and programmes, each claiming to fulfil an EW or ER function.

In addition to a lack of common EU-wide understanding of EW-ER for conflict prevention, **the ad hoc nature of the EU's "system" of early warning and early response** undermined the potential added value of the EU.¹⁰ The following factors illustrate the ad hoc nature of the EU's pre-Lisbon engagement on EW-ER at each stage in the EW-ER process, from conflict analysis, communication of analysis, and decision making to early responses.

Conflict analysis capacity was dependent largely on individual expertise and staffing capacity, and therefore varied greatly. Both in headquarters (HQ) and in country, the quality of conflict analysis was reliant on the individual skill of the analyst or on whether staffing resources were assigned to conduct conflict analysis. It has also been noted that conflict analysis was not consistently documented and lacked a structured approach.¹¹

Information and intelligence sharing took place on a voluntary basis, which potentially undermined both consistency and accuracy. As the threshold and criteria for information or intelligence was an unknown quantity, decision makers could not be sure of what they knew (the analysis), but also of what they did not know (what was missing from the analysis). Additionally, whilst the professional experience of the decision maker could mitigate this to some degree, the risk of a distorted picture of an impending conflict was high.

The lack of defined hierarchy¹² on decision making sustained the warning-response gap. The pre-Lisbon picture of EW-ER was more of a loose architecture spread across more than one EU institution than a well-defined integrated system, so decision-making authority was disaggregated. Furthermore, as few EU staff were clear about the decision-making procedure for early warnings,¹³ the feedback loop from analysis to response was broken. This diminished incentives to provide analysis as the results or impact of the analysis were unknown.¹⁴

9 For more details of the EU's pre- and post-Lisbon bodies that formed part of its early warning – early response architecture, see S. Babaud and N. Mirimanova (2011). *The European Commission Early Warning Architecture and Crisis Response Capacity*. IfP-EW: Brussels; J. Hemmer and R. Smits (2010). *The Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Capability of the Council of the European Union*. IfP-EW: Brussels; T. Beswick (forthcoming). *EU Early Warning and Early Response Capacity for Conflict Prevention in the post-Lisbon Era*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

10 L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Walk the Talk: the EU needs an effective early warning system to match its ambitions to prevent conflict and promote peace*. IfP-EW: Brussels. See also Aide à la Décision Economique (ADE) (2011). *Thematic Evaluation of the European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*.

11 ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*; S. Babaud and N. Mirimanova (2011). *Op. cit.*

12 J. Hemmer and R. Smits (2010). *Op. cit.*

13 Interviews with EEAS and EU Commission officials, Brussels. November 2011. See also ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

14 J. Brante, C. de Franco, C. Meyer and F. Otto (2011). *Op. cit.*

The perceived randomness of early responses and a lack of knowledge about available early response options among EU staff. Those looking from within and from outside the EU would find it difficult to detect a pattern or strategy to the EU's early responses for conflict prevention.¹⁵ In the absence of such a strategy or awareness of a strategy, EU responses have been mostly reactive rather than preventive.¹⁶ In addition, the primary assumption was that it was Member States' political interests alone that determined whether or not the EU intervened.¹⁷

The lack of shared EU understanding on EW-ER and the ad hoc nature of its "system" provide the background to the discussion on the post-Lisbon architecture by identifying a number of target areas for improvement in the emerging EW and ER capacity being developed within the EEAS.

15 S. Babaud and N. Mirimanova (2011). *Op. cit.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011. See also L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Op. cit.*

4. KEY FINDINGS

THE EU'S CAPACITY FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Conflict analysis can be produced by a number of EU actors within Brussels headquarters, in country, and by Member States. At HQ level, the Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the Situation Room, and the geographic desks are the main producers of analysis. In country, political sections within EU delegations (EUDs), Regional Crisis Response Planning Officers (RCRPOs), EU Special Representative (EUSR) in-country teams, and other EU in-country missions such as DG Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO) can also be sources of conflict analysis. In addition to this, there are numerous sources of information and intelligence on which the analysis is based. This represents **a complex and crowded field of actors that each contribute to the EU's conflict analysis**.¹⁸

In the post-Lisbon transition period, **the capacity for EU actors to carry out conflict analysis has not yet reached the level necessary to support more robust action on EW-ER** either at HQ or in-country level.

At HQ level, the procedures for conflict analysis are more robust than for the new EUDs due to their longer history within the EU external action architecture in the Council and the Commission. However, **the comprehensiveness of the intelligence utilised by HQ analysts can be questioned**. In the case of SitCen, it has been observed that, 'despite its role as an EU intelligence-sharing hub, the Lisbon Treaty has not explicitly mandated that member state agencies must share information with the SitCen'¹⁹. This refers back to the pre-Lisbon challenge that one cannot know what has been omitted from the intelligence provided and, therefore, to what degree the analysis or decision is based on a partial picture of the conflict.²⁰

RECOMMENDATION: In order to achieve a truly "whole of the EU" approach, the heads of Member States' civilian and military intelligence authorities should review their intelligence-sharing procedures to ensure better coherence and alignment with the objectives to which EU Member States have committed as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As a first step this item could be put on the agenda of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) for discussion.

In-country delegations have traditionally had little capacity in conflict analysis. The Kenya and Kyrgyzstan case studies showed that although EUD staff demonstrated a good understanding of conflict dynamics, this was not captured and processed in a systematic way (i.e. using a specific methodology, regularly updated and linked to a set of response options).²¹ With the transition to fully-fledged EUDs still in the early stages of implementation, capacity remains weak. Even **where political sections are present in delegations, it has not automatically**

18 In this section, the discussion distinguishes between the production of analysis, information and intelligence. The EU actors described above all have an analysis function, which may be based on sources of traditional intelligence, classified information, or open-source information. Member States are the main sources of traditional intelligence, whether civilian or military. Classified information may be available on an ad hoc basis from other sources, such as non-EU states or intergovernmental organisations. By definition, open-source information can come from any publicly-accessible source, but can also come from civil society or other non-state actors.

19 Security and Defence Agenda Roundtable report (2011). 'The need to know: European information-sharing', accessed 31st October 2011. Available at http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/14/Documents/Publications/2011/Info_sharing_Report.pdf

20 Although conflict analysis is based on many sources other than just Member State civilian and military intelligence, it is nonetheless an important component in the production of analysis, and may influence the final "message".

21 S. Babaud and J. Ndung'u (forthcoming). *Early Warning and Conflict prevention by the EU: learning lessons from the 2008 post-election crisis in Kenya*. IfP-EW: Brussels. See also, S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Early warning, early response? Learning lessons from the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

translated into better conflict analysis outputs.²² This is due to both skills and staff resources, but also to the degree to which it has been embedded in the standing operating procedures of the EUD, who may be more accustomed to limiting their reports to political developments within the country.²³ The Sudans case study research also found that political reporting of EUD staff tended to prioritise political developments from within government.²⁴

RECOMMENDATION: The strengthening of the political sections within the EUDs should explicitly address human resources gaps in conflict analysis. This could be through training in conflict analysis methodology, conflict sensitivity and the mainstreaming of conflict prevention into programming for all Delegation staff. This could also be done through recruitment policies,²⁵ which could consider the retention of a pool of civil society experts or staff with experience in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions or with EUSRs²⁶. The conflict analysis gap should ideally be addressed in both ways to support short- and long-term capacity.²⁷

The issue of partial information for conflict analysis within the EUDs presents the same challenge as partial intelligence in the case of the HQ conflict analysts. More than one IfP-EW case study highlighted the problem that there was **little reliable information on conflicts from outside the capital²⁸ or from remote rural areas²⁹**. The local networks of EU in-country actors, in particular EUD staff tasked with conflict analysis, are vital for obtaining information from rural or less accessible areas of the country.³⁰ Non-state actors such as local civil society organisations (CSOs), can be a useful resource for information or input into conflict / risk assessments.³¹ The IfP-EW Kenya and Kyrgyzstan research revealed how important civil society actors in the country can be to provide information during a crisis, or to issue alerts on weak signals occurring at the local level.³²

RECOMMENDATION: The terms of reference for conflict analysts or political officers within the EUDs should include the building and/or maintenance of a network that reflects a broad geographic reach in order to access reliable information and local assessments of conflict from across the country. The potential to make use of CSO networks or the networks of other EU in-country actors, such as ECHO or Member State embassies could also be enhanced.³³

Given the sheer volume of information and intelligence available to analysts, the current review of the EU's information architecture³⁴ should take into consideration **the limitations of people's individual and collective capacity to manage an overwhelming supply of data** on conflicts³⁵. How this is managed may determine the final "message" of the analysis, and even the decision to act. Whilst the professional experience of the analyst will inform the assessment of sources and will influence his/her familiarity with the needs of decision makers, more "intelligent" technology for collecting and storing data could also facilitate the analysis process. Finally, developing a methodology for the conflict analysis and its dissemination would enhance comparability and assist in the evaluation of the analysis process.

RECOMMENDATION: The three core elements of people, information technology, and methodology³⁶ could be addressed through (1) the previous recommendation on training and recruitment policies; (2) through criteria or technological tools for evaluating sources; (3) by establishing a methodology that stipulates the evidence or format required to meet decision makers' needs.³⁷

22 Interview with Member State representative, Brussels, November 2011.

23 Telephone interview with European Commission official, November 2011.

24 IfP-EW Researchers Workshop, Improving Institutional Capacity for Early Warning cluster, 19th September 2011.

25 As conflict analysis skills are not given recognition or priority within EU institutions' careers structure, there are few incentives for staff to develop and maintain this skills set. Furthermore, the high turnover of staff in fragile and conflict-affected postings impairs the sustainability of EU conflict analysis resources at country level.

26 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

27 ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

28 M. Yacoub (2011). *Conflict early warning challenges in a post war context: The case of the EU in Sri Lanka*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

29 J. van der Zwan (2011). *Evaluating the EU's role and challenges in Sudan and South Sudan*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

30 In Kyrgyzstan, the delegation hired a consultant to do conflict analysis in areas that staff could not easily reach.

31 J. Hemmer and R. Smits (2010). *Op. cit.*

32 S. Babaud and J. Ndung'u (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*; S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*

33 This is already happening in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. See S. Babaud and J. Ndung'u (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*; S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*

34 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

35 L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Op. cit.*

36 Interview with an EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

37 Methodologies should be piloted in a few countries to enhance their operability.

THE EU'S CAPACITY TO COMMUNICATE CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND WARNINGS

As the communication of analysis involves as many actors as conflict analysis itself, reporting lines and communication strategies are key to success. There is **no apparent institutional distinction between the communication of intelligence, analyses and warnings**. This finding mirrors an observation made in the pre-Lisbon IfP-EW mapping research that 'there are many ways to communicate early warnings and other conflict-related information'³⁸. This complicates the communication process as it induces risk aversion at the earliest stage of analysis production and dissemination, because it is not clear whether an output will be perceived as a warning or simply as analysis. This ambiguity may also be derived from an uncertainty in the decision-making hierarchy.³⁹

RECOMMENDATION: The newly established Intelligence Working Group, made up of civilian (SitCen) and military (EUMS) intelligence experts, could contribute to the Conflict Prevention Group's work on an EU early warning and response system by participating in discussions on how to operationalise the distinctions between intelligence, analysis, and warnings across EU EW-ER bodies.

A number of the case studies noted that **each EU in-country actor appears to have their own reporting lines to Brussels**, and in many instances the information transmitted is not systematically shared either at country or at HQ level.⁴⁰ This parallel reporting structure may be due to the fact that 'there are no specific guidelines on how to warn and to whom the warnings should be directed'⁴¹. In the case of Sri Lanka, it was found that whilst analysis was transmitted to Brussels, it was not shared horizontally with other EUD colleagues.⁴² In the Sudans, the flow of information between Members States' embassies and EUDs was deemed insufficient as information flowed from Member States' to Brussels HQ but not to in-country EUDs.⁴³ These multi-channel reporting practices challenge coordination between the different EU actors on the ground and create multiple and divergent analysis and warnings for HQ bodies to try to resolve.

RECOMMENDATION: As delegations now represent the whole of the EU, EUDs are best placed to act as a focal point for reporting. Without jeopardising collegial relations between Brussels and in-country staff, channelling the reporting of EU actors in the country through the EUD would be a first step to ensure better in-country exchange of information and may develop into more coordinated communication from the country level to Brussels HQ.

Despite the merger of most Council and Commission EW-ER bodies into one institution, there are **outstanding technical obstacles that undermine cooperation and information- and analysis-sharing between departments**. The IfP-EW Sudans case study noted an encryption incompatibility between the EUSR team and EUD staff,⁴⁴ which prevented the exchange of analyses, and hampered the ability to communicate a "shared" warning to the decision-making actors at Brussels level. In Kyrgyzstan, due to similar constraints, SitCen and EUSR reports could not be shared with the EUD, which restricted the ability to build a shared understanding of the context and challenges.⁴⁵ Removing technical and procedural obstacles between different EU actors would be both a practical and a symbolic action to support further integration of external action.

RECOMMENDATION: All EU in-country actors, including Commission missions, could have a single, shared platform for posting analysis, which can be accessed at both in-country and HQ level, to facilitate better exchange of analysis for those in country and a more comprehensive meta-analysis process for HQ analysts.⁴⁶

38 S. Babaud and N. Mirimanova (2011). *Op. cit.*

39 This is discussed in further detail in the section: THE EU'S DECISION-MAKING ON EARLY WARNINGS AND EARLY RESPONSES

40 This was identified as an issue in the Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Kenya case studies from the Initiative for Peacebuilding – Improving Institutional Capacity for Early Warning research cluster.

41 L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Op. cit.*

42 M. Yacoub (2011). *Op. cit.*

43 J. van der Zwan (2011). *Op. cit.*

44 *Ibid.*

45 S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*

46 Analysis-sharing rather than information-sharing will require that each actor has a reasonable degree of confidence in the analysis that is produced, and a shared concept of what constitutes analysis, rather than information or intelligence. See the first recommendation in the section: THE EU'S CAPACITY TO COMMUNICATE CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND WARNINGS.

THE EU'S DECISION MAKING ON EARLY WARNINGS AND EARLY RESPONSES

Outside the EU institutions, **the speed of decision making and implementation of responses is noted as a constraint to EU potential for early responses to conflicts.**⁴⁷ The perception of slow decision making can hamper coordinated EU action. In the IfP-EW Sudans case study, a Member State official based in Khartoum cited the EU's bureaucracy and inability to act quickly as one reason for Member States' circumvention of EU processes for political or conflict issues.⁴⁸ For example, the speed of the EU's Instrument for Stability (IfS), which is often quoted by EU officials as a rapid intervention response tool, has been questioned,⁴⁹ and whilst IfS can achieve quite speedy decision making,⁵⁰ the average timeline from a proposal to delivery of funds is two to four months,⁵¹ making it less feasible as an early response mechanism in conflict contexts where things move very fast.

RECOMMENDATION: The Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention, and Mediation Division could take the initiative to raise awareness of the EU's full scope of conflict prevention response options and those that would be most suited to early implementation.⁵²

An institutional culture that promotes "risk aversion"⁵³ raises another hurdle to decision making on early responses. Those providing EU analysis are seen as 'less willing to stick their neck out for fear that it will be chopped off'⁵⁴. Additionally, for decision makers, there is a perception that they prefer to "gamble" on a conflict not occurring rather than taking preventive measures because while preventive costs are low, they are also immediate and visible, whereas the costs of inaction appear distant and more elusive.⁵⁵ Both cases are a consequence of focusing on the prediction, as opposed to the anticipation⁵⁶ of a conflict, thereby requiring analysts to deliver a concrete forecast of exactly when a conflict will erupt.

RECOMMENDATION: A strategy for EW-ER conflict prevention should consider an "anticipation" approach to early warning, which would require that the EU prioritise thorough analysis of conflict drivers and actors, and that in-country, geographic directorate, and situation room staff contribute conflict-relevant updates to the early warning information flow.

The "pre-eminence of crisis response"⁵⁷ in EU interventions on conflict corroborates the risk aversion noted above, as it places more emphasis on a reactive rather than a preventive approach. The EEAS organigramme⁵⁸ confirms the priority status of crisis management and response, giving the crisis structures more direct access to the High Representative (HR/VP) and SitCen than the conflict prevention bodies, which are positioned under the thematic Directorate for Global and Multilateral Issues.⁵⁹ From an institutional perspective, **crisis management appears to hold preferential status.** In the hierarchical structure that is the EEAS, access to the highest decision-making authorities is likely to facilitate the decision-making process; without it conflict prevention will remain further down the priority list.

RECOMMENDATION: The institutional structure within the EEAS should be reviewed and possibly amended to reflect the equal status of conflict prevention and crisis management by creating equal access and reporting lines to decision-making authorities.

47 Interviews and telephone interviews with conflict prevention and peacebuilding civil society representatives, Brussels, November 2011. See also ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

48 J. van der Zwan (2011). *Op. cit.*

49 Participant at the Evaluation of the Commission's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Seminar, Brussels, November 2011.

50 Five working days was cited by an EU Member State representative at the Evaluation of the Commission's Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Seminar, Brussels, November 2011.

51 ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

52 This could enhance institutional awareness of response options that require less time and fewer resources for implementation, thereby potentially encouraging earlier action.

53 Telephone interview with CSO expert on EU early warning and early response structures, November 2011. See also L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Op. cit.*; J. Brante, C. de Franco, C. Meyer and F. Otto (2011). *Op. cit.*

54 Telephone interview with CSO expert on EU early warning and early response structures, November 2011.

55 L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Op. cit.*

56 J. Cilliers (2005). 'Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa'. *Occasional paper 102*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

57 S. Babaud and N. Mirmanova (2011). *Op. cit.*

58 European External Action Service (2011). 'Graphic representation', accessed 3rd October 2011. Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf

59 According to the EEAS structure as of February 2012.

Research on the pre-Lisbon EW-ER capacity of the Council revealed that ‘there is **no formal hierarchy of early warning agencies**, which creates uncertainties with regard to who is ultimately responsible for the delivery and quality of information on potential crisis situations.’⁶⁰ With such a large number of actors working on early warning and/or early responses, a good starting point would be to clarify not only the decision-making lines of authority for each of the possible EU responses, but also to determine which bodies should be included in the information flow of analysis, warnings, and response considerations. As it stands, there is variable awareness of these procedures across the EEAS but it has not yet been brought together in a common EU arrangement.

RECOMMENDATION: The newly conceived Conflict Prevention Group could take up the task of clarifying the decision-making process and level of authority required to implement the different EU conflict prevention responses in consultation with the Group’s members from across EU institutions. The output should be disseminated amongst all EU external action actors.

THE EU’S RESPONSES & CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO EARLY WARNINGS

The majority of actions that the EU has undertaken have been responses to conflict rather than responses to early warnings. This finding mirrors pre-Lisbon observations on the EU’s capacity for conflict prevention responses from the IfP-EW Commission and Council mapping reports, but also in the evaluation of the Commission’s support on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.⁶¹ This reactive approach was visible in a number of the IfP-EW case study countries. In response to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the EU strengthened the political resources of the EUD, deploying a SitCen representative and EUSR advisers on the ground.⁶² In the Sudans, it was observed that “by not being in a position to address causes and drivers of conflict, the EU tends to rely on crisis response instruments”.⁶³ The key findings from the section on the *EU’s Decision-Making on Early Warnings and Early Responses* concerning the length of decision making, risk aversion, and the apparent institutional preference for crisis management over conflict prevention could all explain the “gap” between early warnings and responses that leads to delayed action.

RECOMMENDATION: Please see first three recommendations from the Section *THE EU’S DECISION MAKING ON EARLY WARNINGS AND EARLY RESPONSES* (above). Put together, these three recommendations to raise awareness of all conflict-prevention response options, to consider an “anticipation” approach to early warning, and to review the institutional inequality between conflict prevention and crisis management would go some way towards promoting a preventive culture within EEAS structures.

Resistance to an external action strategy on conflict prevention that includes external trade weakens the potential for an integrated EU conflict-prevention response. The EU’s trade partnerships and negotiations towards trade agreements form a key part of the EU’s external action. However, as trade remains outside the EEAS structure, the potential to utilise trade-related conflict-prevention responses remains weak. The case of Sri Lanka demonstrates the value of the EU’s trade profile, when threats of restrictive measures on trade were issued and followed through.⁶⁴ However, in the IfP-EW case study on Colombia, trade was treated entirely separately from other external action, which led to a situation where human rights abuses were being condemned within the EU Parliament, whilst the Commission negotiations on a trade agreement with Colombia continued uninterrupted.⁶⁵

RECOMMENDATION: Heads of Delegation and geographic Directors are in an ideal position to identify potential incoherence or opportunities for preventive responses related to EU external trade. Increased cooperation on conflict sensitivity between geographic staff and DG Trade Commission negotiators would facilitate more integrated, coherent and therefore robust responses to conflict that encompass a trade dimension.

60 J. Hemmer and R. Smits (2010). *Op. cit.*

61 S. Babaud and N. Mirmanova (2011). *Op. cit.*; J. Hemmer and R. Smits (2010). *Op. cit.*; ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

62 S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*

63 J. van der Zwan (2011). *Op. cit.*

64 M. Yacoub (2011). *Op. cit.*

65 S. Gratius (2011). *The EU’s potential and limits for early warning in Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela. Comparative case study of Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela.* IfP-EW: Brussels.

Competition over ownership and visibility of responses can create obstacles to EU action versus unilateral Member State action. In the Sudans, for example, the case study found that political competition hindered EU responses because certain Member States 'want[ed] to claim individual success'.⁶⁶ Member States were not necessarily willing to commit to stronger coordination by the EUSR on North-South dialogue, despite the EUSR mandate, because of the desire to pursue national approaches.⁶⁷ The case study of Armenia also supports this finding with reference to the privileged position France occupies as one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group through which it monopolises information which could be useful for EU action on conflict prevention.⁶⁸

RECOMMENDATION: Member States and the HR/VP should, in consultation with EU conflict prevention officials, elaborate the EU's role in early conflict prevention based on the resources and responses at its disposal in order to try to reduce competition. Encouraging Member States and the HR/VP to engage in a discussion of the EU's niche value could help to clarify and provide a indication of when collective EU action is seen as preferable.⁶⁹

Not all conflict prevention responses require significant financial input. Less resource-intensive early responses such as political statements and political dialogue can be effective prevention instruments. The Kenya IfP-EW case study noted a positive impact on key reforms related to the conflict from media engagement and periodic opinion articles by the EUD in Nairobi.⁷⁰ The ADE Evaluation also reported on the increased use of political dialogue for short-term prevention, and that this was linked to the presence of a political section within the EUDs.⁷¹ The value of such interventions is borne out by the experience noted in the Kyrgyzstan study of intensive political dialogue and diplomacy from April-July 2010 by the EUSR, in tandem with the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.⁷²

RECOMMENDATION: EW-ER decision-makers (including at Head of Delegation level) should take into account in their decision making the fact that less resource-intensive response options may facilitate a swifter response. Decision makers must weigh early but incremental actions, which may be more effective, with later, larger responses that are more politically visible.

66 J. van der Zwan (2011). *Op. cit.*

67 *Ibid.*

68 The authors of the study call for more regular consultations between the French co-Chair and the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the HR/VP to overcome this problem.

69 Although there may be a tacit understanding of this within the PSC and for the leadership of the EEAS, there is no such clarity of understanding for the officials working at the implementation and policy end of conflict-related engagements. Based on an interview with Member State Representative, Brussels, November 2011.

70 S. Babaud and J. Ndung'u (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

71 ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

72 S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*

5. OVERARCHING CHALLENGES TO THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT WITH EW-ER FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

As well as findings related to the stages of early warning to early response, there are overarching challenges associated with the nature of early warning and early responses to conflict prevention as political actions, and to the lack of leadership within the EU's engagement in EW-ER specifically. These challenges also need to be addressed in order to produce more effective EU responses to impending conflicts.

From the case study evidence and interviews, it seems that the pre-Lisbon problem of **a lack of a common EU-wide understanding of early warning and early response for conflict prevention** has yet to be addressed within the post-Lisbon structures. The question of the purpose and expectations for an EU EW-ER system remains unanswered: '[is it] there to identify the signals and root causes of a conflict over a shorter or longer timeframe, leading to preventive action, or [is it] simply a tool that helps to predict whether and when a crisis will erupt?'⁷³ The HR/VP's and Member States' answer to this question will go some way towards providing much-needed direction for initiatives on EW-ER systems that are underway within the EEAS.⁷⁴

Conflict prevention carries the inherent challenge that it is not, and cannot be, politically neutral.

Without the acknowledgement that conflict prevention carries political "risks", which cannot be buried under the guise of EU security or development, the EU's ability to act effectively on conflict prevention according to its own mandate⁷⁵ is reduced. EW-ER conflict prevention cannot not be driven purely by the EU's security interests, nor viewed solely as a development engagement. For countries that are neither security nor development priorities, such as the case study countries of Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Armenia,⁷⁶ conflict is still a reality. However, if the EU does not recognise it as a distinct issue, any EU attempts to carry out conflict-prevention actions will not be designed or implemented to meet the unique challenges of conflict contexts.

More can be done to **develop and articulate the EU's niche role and resources among other national, regional and international actors** with regard to the broad range of EU instruments available from humanitarian to development, trade and security, and its extended network of actors both within the EU institutions and through Member States. Spreading awareness of the EU's response options both within the EU and amongst other international actors could facilitate more efficient use of EU response instruments as part of multilateral efforts and provide opportunities for the EU to play a bigger role in early responses for conflict prevention based on its particular strengths.

73 S. Babaud and N. Mirimanova (2011). *Op. cit.*; S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*; S. Babaud and J. Ndung'u (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

74 Telephone interview with European Commission official, November 2011; Telephone interview with CSO expert on EU early warning and early response structure, November 2011. See also T. Beswick (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

75 European Union (2007). 'The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty Establishing the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community', *Official Journal of the European Union 2007/C 306/01*. Lisbon.

76 M. Yacoub (2011). *Op. cit.*; M. R. Freire and L. Simão (2011). *Multilevel Dynamics in the EU's Approach to Preventive Action in Armenia*. IfP-EW: Brussels; S. Gratius (2011). *Op. cit.*

The fact that **successful responses to early warnings for conflict prevention are by their nature invisible** makes building collaborative political will to intervene a significant challenge. The HR/VP has a primary role to play in highlighting the political necessity of conflict prevention based on existing commitments,⁷⁷ but also in presenting the advantages of conflict prevention in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Early warning and early response 'has to be sold' to Member States.⁷⁸

In this transition period, the EEAS is battling with multiple organisational cultures with staff from the European Commission, the Council, and Member State secondees.⁷⁹ At the same time, it is developing its institutional procedures within the completely new EEAS setting. In addition to this, EU staff are adapting to expanded and changing mandates, including conflict prevention. These simultaneous processes are hardly conducive to systematic and considered development and implementation of new policies, therefore extra effort from the Council and the HR/VP needs to be made to provide direction within this complex EEAS picture.

⁷⁷ Telephone interview with European Commission official, November 2011.

⁷⁸ Telephone interview with CSO expert on EU early warning and early response structures, November 2011.

⁷⁹ Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011. See also ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

6. THE FUTURE OF EU ENGAGEMENT IN EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE

The key findings in the report highlight the continuing challenge of executing common foreign and security policy for 27 states and, in particular, the challenge of promoting early action on conflict where both the risk and the fruits of success can be either difficult to distinguish or intangible. First and foremost, the EU is a political actor and, as such, the politics of low-profile or invisible action may be difficult to “sell” to Member States and their national constituencies of voters.

In contrast, the EU’s repeated commitments to conflict prevention and to early warning and early response are both distinguishable and tangible, and therefore deserve attention and leadership to determine the way forward for EU engagement in early warning and early response for conflict prevention. What is missing from the patchwork of activities and initiatives springing up within the EEAS is an overarching strategy to shape and determine how the EU *does* EW-ER conflict prevention.

At present, there are only “weak signals” on how EU external action staff should engage with EW-ER conflict prevention. In addition, whilst this research cluster has sought to uncover obstacles that may hinder early warning and responses in institutional and procedural terms, this is no substitute for a clear strategy which provides direction on the EU’s goals with regard to early warning and early action on emerging conflicts. As one interviewee put it, ‘if the level of ambition is there, the structures will follow’.⁸⁰ Aside from offering political guidance, such a strategy could also delineate the EU-specific capacity for EW-ER; the function or purpose of the various steps between conflict analysis, early-warning and implementation of an EU response; more broadly establish expectations for those EU actors involved in the various stages of EW-ER. What follows is intended to serve loosely as a basis for discussion on the political direction that the new external action structures could take.

OPTIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT

OPTION A: THE EU FULFILS ITS POTENTIAL AS A LEADER IN EARLY WARNING AND EARLY RESPONSE

Option A would see the EU pursuing **an ambition to be a global leader in early warning and early response to conflict prevention, harnessing the post-Lisbon architecture of a rich and varied menu of expertise and resources**. There are many within and outside EU institutions who would support such an ambition, and would like to see the EU leverage the capacity of its extended network of EU actors and instruments, including those of Member States. From the post-Lisbon mapping exercise it was clear that a number of new actors within EEAS that could contribute to EW-ER are emerging,⁸¹ and that interest in early warning and response from the newly-conceived Conflict Prevention Group supports renewed efforts on this topic.

This option would see an EW-ER structure emerging based on strong leadership and political will from Member States and the HR/VP that would mirror the leadership shown on crisis management. Redressing the imbalance of priority for crisis management over conflict prevention would be a key feature of this strategy, and would also reflect the cost-benefit advantages of early prevention versus late management responses. Option A also aligns

⁸⁰ Telephone interview with European Commission official, November 2011.

⁸¹ T. Beswick (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

with the EU's standing as the world's biggest aid donor⁸², and would see the EU **leveraging its financial weight to build corresponding political influence that could underpin its conflict prevention interventions**. As one interviewee observed, 'if the EU wants to be a significant global diplomatic player, it needs to have EW and ER capability.'⁸³

A cohesive EU EW-ER system would require that institutional and political hurdles, such as those outlined in this report, were tackled to ensure the maximum efficiency of the system and **a truly integrated system for early responses to emerging conflicts that encompasses Member-State activities, and those from across the EU institutions**. Obstacles to efficient early conflict prevention responses range from the technical, to the institutional and finally to the political. Overcoming these hurdles can therefore not be restricted to any one of these levels if far-reaching EU ambitions for EW-ER to conflict are to be achieved.

OPTION B: THE EU PURSUES EARLY RESPONSES BASED ON PRECEDENCE AND PREFERENCE⁸⁴

In line with precedence, an Option B strategy for EW-ER could be derived from the existing range of response options open to the EU and EU Member States under the CFSP. **An inverted focus on early warning that takes the response arsenal as a starting point** would rationalise and focus the EU's engagement in conflict prevention based on existing capabilities⁸⁵ and within the accepted political boundaries of EU and Member State preferences, thereby going some way to addressing the obstacles of capacity and political will. An advantage of an EW system tied to responses is that the purpose of early warning becomes clear to those engaged in the analysis and warning end of the system, thereby closing at least the conceptual gap between early warning and early response.

In accordance with precedence, EW-ER could be focused on the **areas where the EU has already demonstrated added value in relation to individual EU Member States, other non-EU global powers, regional organisations, international organisations, or non-state actors**; for example, where few EU Member States have a presence in a country. One interviewee noted a "distance" criteria for Member States' interest, observing that, aside from the historical ties of the "EU 15", the Council was more likely to delegate to EU institutional actors for conflicts occurring outside the EU neighbourhood as the political priority was likely to be lower.⁸⁶ If EU engagement with EW-ER conflict prevention would be based on an explicit EU response role, it would help to delineate where the EU as an actor has specific value, and therefore might reduce overlap with Member States as there is less motivation to pursue unilateral action.

Option B also **incorporates the EU's role as a funder of international or multilateral early response conflict prevention activities, but ties it specifically to contexts where the political risks of an EU-only response are perceived as too high**.⁸⁷ In some countries, the EU's engagement already seems to revolve around the funding of activities by other non-state or international actors.⁸⁸ The flexibility of a funding role allows for the pursuit of individual Member State initiatives as the primary intervention, whilst allowing the EU to contribute in a way that does not contravene Member State preferences.

82 EUROPA (2011). 'Development and Cooperation. Helping others to help themselves', accessed 8th December 2011. Available at <http://europa.eu/pol/dev/>

83 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

84 This option is discussed in more detail in an upcoming policy brief on EU Conflict Prevention Strategy by the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit.

85 Some EU actors already have a strong capacity to achieve early warning and early responses, such as EUSRs, which were noted by several interviewees as an effective tool due to their high levels of autonomy and their direct access to the highest decision makers. They were also given scope to proactively propose responses to the HR/VP and the PSC rather than waiting to seek guidance. Based on interview with Member State Representative, Brussels, November 2011; Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

86 Interview with Member State Representative, Brussels, November 2011; Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

87 ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

88 In the Sudans, the EU has funded the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Thabo Mbeki's role as chief mediator as part of the African Union's High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan, the referendum and post-referendum process, and a Technical Advisor for the Three Areas. See J. van der Zwan (2011). *Op. cit.*

OPTION C: THE EU FOCUSES ON STRUCTURAL CONFLICT PREVENTION AND SUPPORT FOR THIRD PARTY EARLY WARNING

Given the obstacles to early warning and early responses in the particular EU political and institutional context, Option C would equate with a focus on **long-term structural conflict prevention based on a thorough analysis of the conflict drivers, actors, and developments**, which may be more viable in terms of an EU role in conflict prevention. More than one interviewee noted that the prediction of conflicts was sometimes unachievable, and that an EW system would always be reliant on the human element of decision making, based on the expertise of the relevant officials.⁸⁹ Conflicts cannot be predicted like weather; long-running contexts of fragility might constantly produce conflicts, therefore, a focus on the underlying structural drivers is more valuable.⁹⁰ Option C could even serve an interim function; by upgrading EU capacity and strength on long-term conflict prevention, this could eventually create more political will for early responses by demonstrating the value of EU instruments and building an “appetite” for earlier prevention.⁹¹

Following on from the prioritisation of structural conflict prevention is the idea of **linking long-term prevention more closely with EU development and humanitarian programming, which could reduce the political sensitivities surrounding conflict intervention**.⁹² Developing conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity skills within geographic desks would promote more conflict-sensitive input from the EEAS’s geographic desks into development and humanitarian interventions carried out by other EU actors.⁹³ Mainstreaming conflict prevention would need to be more significant than providing a paragraph on the conflict in EUD or geographic reporting;⁹⁴ it would require that EU country experts are fully integrated into programme development, whether at in-country or at HQ level.

The existence of **local, national and regional early warning systems and conflict analysis capacity presents an opportunity for cooperation** that could reduce the burden of in-country analysis and warning to some extent, and could support early warning initiatives that are “closer” to the conflict. This could take an internal or external character, either in the form of a more “federated” approach⁹⁵, which would allow EU bodies to utilise the conflict analysis capacity of EU Member States, or a more extended network of cooperation with early warning systems that are either already in existence, or that would benefit from EU support.⁹⁶ Between 2001 and 2010, the European Commission channelled 51 percent of its financial support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding through international organisations.⁹⁷ Civil society was the third main channel for the Commission to deliver conflict-prevention and peacebuilding support.⁹⁸ Therefore, the potential for the EU to scale back its direct engagement with early warning and early response, and focus on supporting local, national and international actors closer to the ground, would certainly be in line with this practice.⁹⁹

89 Interview with Member State Representative, Brussels, November 2011; Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011; S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (2011). *Op. cit.*; S. Babaud and J. Ndung’U (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

90 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

91 Telephone interview with European Commission official, November 2011.

92 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

93 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

94 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

95 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, November 2011.

96 The IFP-EW case studies in Bolivia and Colombia identified national early warning systems that could benefit from either financial or technical EU support.

97 ADE (2011). *Op. cit.*

98 *Ibid.*

99 EU funding of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation role as part of the African Union’s High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan; funding of the African Union Continental EW System; the potential to fund Bolivian and Colombian national EW systems.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is clear from a comparison of the key findings in the pre- and post-Lisbon research that there are outstanding issues to be resolved, such as poor capacity and expertise in conflict analysis. However, the mapping of the current post-Lisbon architecture does reveal the willingness of most bodies within the new EEAS structure to try to renew engagement with early warning and early responses for conflict prevention.¹⁰⁰ Aside from the key findings for each of the stages between early warning and early response, there are overarching challenges to how the EU approaches early action on conflict prevention. Those challenges cannot be overcome merely through institutional reforms, but rather they require more leadership from the highest decision-making levels to ensure that efforts to move forward with EW-ER within EU institutions are conducted in a cohesive and integrated manner.

The concept of conducting early interventions to prevent conflict brings its own unique challenges that differ from structural conflict prevention or reactive crisis management. Unlike structural conflict transformation which has the luxury of longer timeframes for planning and generating impacts, early interventions by their very nature demand immediate decisions and are evaluated according to their ability to deliver immediate results. In crisis management, actors are dealing with a “known quantity” in that the conflict and the dynamics of the conflict are clearly visible. In contrast, prevention and especially early preventive actions have to take place in a much less concrete conflict context, where the dynamics have not yet emerged in a defined way.

An EU strategy for conflict prevention and, in particular, for early warning and early response will need to take account of these unique challenges in deciding how to position itself among the variety of global actors working on conflict prevention and how to communicate to its internal and external audience an EU vision for preventing and reducing the effects of violent conflict.

100 T. Beswick (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

ANNEX I – LIST OF REPORTS: IMPROVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR EARLY WARNING IFP-EW RESEARCH CLUSTER

COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

J. van der Zwan (2011). *Evaluating the EU's Role and Challenges in Sudan and South Sudan*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

M. R. Freire and L. Simão (2011). *Multilevel Dynamics in the EU's Approach to Preventive Action in Armenia*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

M. Yacoub (2011). *Conflict early warning challenges in a post war context: The case of the EU in Sri Lanka*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

S. Babaud and K. Quinn Judge (forthcoming). *Early warning, early response? Learning lessons from the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

S. Babaud and J. Ndung'u. (2011). *Early Warning and Conflict prevention by the EU: learning lessons from the 2008 post-election crisis in Kenya*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

S. Gratius (2011). *The EU's potential and limits for early warning in Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela. Comparative case study of Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

OTHER CLUSTER REPORTS

J. Hemmer and R. Smits (2010). *The Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Capability of the Council of the European Union*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

L. Montanaro and J. Schünemann (2011). *Walk the Talk: the EU needs an effective early warning system to match its ambitions to prevent conflict and promote peace*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

S. Babaud and N. Mirimanova (2011). *The European Commission Early Warning Architecture and Crisis Response Capacity*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

T. Beswick (forthcoming). *EU Early Warning and Early Response Capacity for Conflict Prevention in the post-Lisbon Era*. IfP-EW: Brussels.

ANNEX II – LIST OF EW-ER BODIES¹⁰¹

Conflict Prevention Group	CPG
Conflict Management Board	CMB
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate	CMPD
Crisis Management Platforms	CMP
EU External Action Service Regional Coordinators	
European Union Delegation	EUD
European Union Military Staff	EUMS
EU Special Representative	EUSR
Foreign Policy Instruments Service	FPI
High-Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission	HR/VP
Intelligence Steering Board	ISB
Intelligence Working Group	IWG
Joint Situation Centre	Sitcen
Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Mediation Division	PCPMD
Political and Security Committee	PSC
Regional Crisis Response Planning Officer	RCRPO
Situation Room	
Watchkeeping Capability	WKC

¹⁰¹ For more details about the various bodies and their relationship to early warning and early responses for conflict prevention, see the IfP-EW Mapping report: T. Beswick (forthcoming). *Op. cit.*

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