

URBAN VIOLENCE IN CARACAS AND RIO DE JANEIRO: LOCAL AND EUROPEAN RESPONSES

Susanne Gratius and Marcelo Valença

December 2011



ABOUT IFP-EW

The Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action (IfP-EW) is a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission. It draws on the expertise of 10 members with offices across the EU and in conflict-affected countries. It aims to develop and harness international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure that all stakeholders, including EU institutions, can access strong, independent, locally derived analysis in order to facilitate better informed and more evidence-based policy and programming decisions.

This document has been produced with financial assistance of the EU. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of IfP-EW/FRIDE and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the EU. To learn more, visit <http://www.ifp-ew.eu>.

ABOUT FRIDE

FRIDE is a think tank based in Madrid which aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe's role in the international arena. It strives to break new ground in its core research interests of peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, and development and humanitarian aid, and mould debate in governmental and non-governmental bodies through rigorous analysis, rooted in the values of justice, equality and democracy. FRIDE seeks to provide fresh and innovative thinking on Europe's role on the international stage. As a prominent European think tank, FRIDE benefits from political independence, diversity of views and the intellectual background of its international staff. To learn more, visit <http://www.fride.org>.

Cover image: © SEASDH - Secretaria de Assistência Social e Direi
© Initiative for Peacebuilding 2011

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.

URBAN VIOLENCE IN CARACAS
AND RIO DE JANEIRO: LOCAL
AND EUROPEAN RESPONSES

AUTHOR PROFILES

Susanne Gratius joined FRIDE, Madrid, in 2005 as Senior Researcher specialised in EU-Latin American relations. Prior to joining the foundation, she worked as a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, and at the Ibero-American Studies Institute (IIK, now GIGA), Hamburg. Until 1999, she was coordinator at the European-Latin American Relations Institute (IRELA), Madrid. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Hamburg and the University Complutense of Madrid. Her research focuses on EU-Latin American relations, democracy, integration and security with special attention to Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and emerging powers.

Marcelo M. Valença¹ is a post-doctoral fellow at the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) with a research grant from the Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ). He holds a Doctorate in International Relations by the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio, 2010). His research themes involve Critical Security Studies, Peace Studies, International Law, and Brazilian Foreign Policy.

1 Principal author of Chapter 3.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Caracas and Rio de Janeiro are prominent examples of urban violence. Although local responses vary, police reform is a common strategy applied by the authorities in both cities. While the new peace police (UPP - Unidades de Policia Pacificadora [Peace Police Units]) represent a shift towards early warning and conflict prevention in Rio de Janeiro, the Policía Nacional Bolivariana [National Bolivarian Police] (PNB) operates in one district of Caracas and is still at an initial stage. Decreasing homicide rates and positive public opinion polls in Rio de Janeiro illustrate that UPPs are considered the most successful security initiative in recent decades to prevent and combat urban violence. Alarming homicide rates in Caracas, however, prove that governmental responses have not yet been successful. This report compares both experiences of communitarian policing and identifies possibilities for bilateral cooperation on public security. The publication concludes with a series of recommendations for the European Union and some proposals for the strengthening of tripartite cooperation to tackle urban violence through early warning and conflict-prevention policies.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU

Regional (comparative) level:

- To explore the possibilities and limits for tripartite cooperation on public security and urban violence between Caracas and Rio de Janeiro under the auspices of the European Union;
- To strengthen the exchange of local responses on urban violence aimed at early warning and conflict prevention within the framework of URB-AL (particularly network 13 on public security);
- To improve the exchange of experiences of certain EU member States (particularly Spain, Italy and France) with Brazil and Venezuela on urban violence and communitarian policing, including early warning.

Bilateral level (Brazil/Rio de Janeiro):

- To offer financial and logistic support for training and the long-term approach of the UPP community programme in Rio de Janeiro, including an early warning component;
- To increase bilateral cooperation on public security between Brazil and the EU (drugs trafficking, organised crime, policing) within the framework of the Strategic Partnership's recent action plan;
- To reactivate EU projects focused on social development in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro;
- To explore the possibility of transferring the experience of UPPs to other Latin American cities (within the framework of URB-AL).

Bilateral level (Venezuela/Caracas):

- To include security concerns in the agenda of bilateral dialogue and cooperation with the Venezuelan government;
- To redesign the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) towards a greater emphasis on the causes and consequences of urban violence;
- To increase funds for NGOs addressing public security, youth and urban violence in Caracas;
- To insist on the EU's participation in police reforms implemented by central and local government in Caracas, including early warning;
- To promote dialogue between government and NGOs on public security and urban violence to identify common solutions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to express her gratitude to those who contributed to this report, including interview partners in Rio de Janeiro and Caracas. Special thanks go to Francine Jácome and her study on Violence, insecurity and political polarisation in Venezuela² which has been the main basis for the analysis on urban violence in Caracas. Interpretations, as well as errors, omissions and interpretations are the author's own responsibility.

2 F. Jácome (2011). *Violencia, inseguridad y polarización política en Venezuela [Violence, insecurity and political polarisation in Venezuela]*. IfP-EW: Caracas. Available at <http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/2011111fPEWFRIDEViolenciaInseguridadEnVenezuela.pdf>

CONTENTS:

| | | |
|----|---|----|
| 1. | Introduction | 10 |
| 2. | Violence in Caracas | 11 |
| | 2.1 The situation | 11 |
| | 2.2.1 Local responses | 12 |
| | 2.2.1. The government(s) | 12 |
| | 2.2.2. NGOs and civil society | 14 |
| | 2.3. EU projects | 14 |
| 3. | (In)security in R o de Janeiro | 16 |
| | 3.1 The situation | 16 |
| | 3.2 Local responses | 17 |
| | 3.2.1 The Government of Rio de Janeiro | 17 |
| | 3.2.2 Viva Rio and civil society responses | 19 |
| | 3.3 The limited role of the EU | 20 |
| 4. | Tripartite cooperation on urban violence | 21 |
| | 4.1 Lessons from Caracas and Rio | 21 |
| | 4.2 Tripartite cooperation and recommendations for the EU | 22 |

ACRONYMS:

| | |
|------------------|--|
| CSP | Country Strategy Paper |
| CONAREPOL | Comisión Nacional para la Reforma Policial [National Commission for Police Reform] |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EIDHR | European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights |
| EU | European Union |
| GPAE | Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais [Group of Police in Special Areas] |
| INCOSEC | Instituto de Investigaciones de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana [Institute for Research on Coexistence and Citizens' Security] |
| ISP | Instituto de Segurança Pública [Institute for Public Security] |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OVP | Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones [Venezuelan Observatory of Prisons] |
| PM | Policia Militar [Military Police] Policía Metropolitana [Venezuela] |
| POP | Problem-Oriented Policing |
| PRONASCI | Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania [National Programme of Public Security with Citizenship] |
| PROVEA | Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos [Venezuelan Programme of Education and Action on Human Rights] |
| UPP | Unidades de Policia Pacificadora [Peace Police Units] |
| WOLA | Washington Office on Latin America |

1. INTRODUCTION

In many countries, the unequal and sometimes chaotic urbanisation process has led to an increase in homicide rates, kidnapping, robbery and organised crime. Urban violence encompasses a series of specific problems like the existence of criminal groups or youth gangs in slums³ and poorer areas of the cities, where the state has no or weak presence. In those urban areas, dominated by warlords and structural violence⁴, the state has lost its authority over legitimate violence and, thus, the capacity for early warning, conflict prevention and response. These conflict zones are often affected by physical violence and the dominance of criminal authoritarian structures. The “geography of violence” creates a vicious circle of permanent fear and insecurity which erodes citizenship, democracy and development. Young, poor men between 18 and 24 years of age are the main victims and perpetrators of urban violence.

Social inequity, weak institutions, the circulation of arms, and criminal gangs related to the drugs business have created an explosive mix in Latin America. Despite the absence of inter-state conflicts, the region is one of the most violent in the world. Homicide rates and kidnapping are particularly high in cities. Given the authoritarian past and military heritage of Latin American countries, the standard answers of many governments have been the reinforcement of public security (by military means) and penal laws. Integrated responses of early warning and conflict prevention by tackling the social and criminal roots of the problem have been the exception rather than the rule.

Rio de Janeiro and Caracas are prominent examples of both urban violence and public insecurity. Local responses vary, but police reform (UPPs in Rio de Janeiro and the PNB in Caracas) have been a common strategy applied by local authorities. Early warning and conflict prevention are major goals of security sector reforms in Rio de Janeiro, and might also play a role in police reforms in Caracas, which are still at an initial stage.

Apart from some EU member states’ engagement in police reform, the international donor community, including the EU, has mainly been absent when it comes to tackling urban violence and public security. Nonetheless, (limited) European development assistance addresses the socio-economic and political roots of violence, particularly in Rio’s *favelas* and in poor urban areas of Caracas.

This publication is based on current literature, local interviews and the results of the workshop “Dialogue on urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and Caracas: prospects, alternatives and contributions of the EU”. The event took place on 30th June-1st July 2011 in Rio de Janeiro and was co-organised by FLACSO Brazil and FRIDE under the auspices of the European Union⁵.

Statistics and policies on public (in)security in Caracas are based on local interviews and the aforementioned report by Francine Jácome. Apart from interviews with local stakeholders carried out by Susanne Gratius, statistics and information on Rio de Janeiro were researched by Marcelo Valença, a post-doctoral fellow at UERJ in Rio de Janeiro.

3 M. Davis (2004). *Planet of Slums, Urban Involution and the Urban Proletariat*. *New Left Review*, Nr. 26.

4 According to Johann Galtung, “structural violence” refers to a process embedded into the structure of society based on unequal life changes. See J. Galtung (1969). ‘Violence, peace and peace research’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 6, n° 3, p.171.

5 For more information see: <http://www.ifp-ew.eu/resources/1106flasco.pdf>

2. VIOLENCE IN CARACAS

2.1 THE SITUATION

Since 1989, Venezuela's homicide rate has steadily increased. The social protests of the so-called *Caracazo* against the economic adjustment policy of President Carlos Andrés Pérez marked the beginning of a vicious circle between public insecurity, social inequity and political polarisation. Democratic decline and de-institutionalisation also date back to 1989. Ten years later, former military officer Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency and began to concentrate power. Due to insufficient responses, urban violence in Caracas has reached historic records under his government. According to recent opinion polls⁶, 90 percent of Venezuelans identify violence as their major concern.

Although public insecurity has a long history in Venezuela's capital, current data reflect a serious problem⁷. While Caracas's homicide rate was lower than 365 victims per year until the beginning of the 1990s, according to INCOSEC, it reached 2,565 in 2008⁸. With a homicide rate of 130 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010 (four times that of Rio de Janeiro), Caracas has become one of the most dangerous cities in the world⁹. According to official data revealed by local media¹⁰, in the first eight months of 2011 more than 2,000 people were killed with firearms. Nine out of ten victims are young (15-25 years old) and poor men.

Weak institutions and an impunity rate of 93 percent of crimes contribute to the spiral of urban insecurity. Venezuela's prisons are among the most violent in Latin America¹¹. The violent riots in El Rodeo jail in the outskirts of Caracas in June 2011 revealed the urgent need for reform to the prisons system, something long called for by Amnesty International and local NGOs¹². A related problem is the slow, dysfunctional and politicised judicial system.

According to NGOs, in Caracas¹³ one in two citizens is living in a *favela* (in Rio de Janeiro the relation is one in three). Public security is a major problem in some urban areas such as Petare in the state of Miranda (governed by the opposition) or Antímano, Catia, 23 de Enero, La Pastora and El Valle in the district of Libertador (dominated by *Chavistas*). According to local media, 79 percent of homicides in Caracas occurred in its largest district, Libertador¹⁴. Some of those areas in which the state has been traditionally absent are governed by criminal gangs or paramilitary groups like the *Piedrita* in 23 de Enero.

6 F. Jácome (2011). *Op. cit.*

7 For further details see R. Briceño-León (2007). 'Violencia, ciudadanía y miedo en Caracas [Violence, citizenship and fear in Caracas]'. *Foro Internacional [International Forum]*, Nr. 3 (July-September), México D.F., pp.551-576.

8 INCOSEC (2011). 'La Seguridad es nuestra Misión [Safety is our Mission]', accessed 3rd December 2011. Available at <http://incosec.sumospace.com>

9 Some observers even argue that Caracas is the fourth most dangerous city in the world. See M. Castro. 'Caracas es la capital más violenta del mundo [Caracas is the world's most violent capital]', *El Nacional*, Caracas, 14th January 2011.

10 M. Isoliet Iglesias and D. Ramírez Miranda. 'En Libertador ocurrieron 79% de los homicidios de Caracas [79% of homicides in Caracas occurred in Libertador]', *El Universal*, Caracas, 14th September 2011.

11 In 2004, the government declared a situation of emergency in national prisons.

12 'Deadly clashes highlight need for urgent prison reform in Venezuela', *Amnesty International*, 22nd June 2011. Available at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/deadly-clashes-highlight-need-urgent-prison-reform-venezuela-2011-06-22>; OVP (2009). *Situación carcelaria en Venezuela. Informe 2009 [Situation of jails in Venezuela. Report 2009]*. Caracas.

13 Caracas is divided into five districts by size: Libertador (2.6 million inhabitants), Sucre, Baruta, El Hatillo and Chacao. Each of them is divided into smaller areas called *parroquias* (22 in the case of Libertador).

14 M. Isoliet Iglesias and D. Ramírez Miranda (2011). *Op.cit.*



(Source: http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archivo:Distrito_metropolitano_de_caracas2.svg)

Violence in Caracas is a result of three main driving factors¹⁵:

- a fragile and inefficient state (at the central and local level) without the capacity to mediate or channel social conflicts;
- a government which lacked for too long the political will to respond, and a weakened civil society without real capacity to react;
- a high level of political polarisation¹⁶ under the Chávez government (1999-present).

Two major theories have been explored to explain public insecurity in Caracas: (i) the government's vision of the social roots of violence related to poverty and inequity (contradicted by a substantial reduction in poverty since 1999); (ii) civil society's view on de-institutionalisation and impunity, combined with a "culture of violence" and an increasing level of political polarisation (opposed by the government)¹⁷. These different approaches reflect the lack of common ground between government and civil society actors, which has further contributed to increasing levels of violence.

2.2. LOCAL RESPONSES

Public security is a highly politicised issue in Venezuela. Official data have not been published since 2005 and some representatives of NGOs who have revealed governmental data have been subject to intimidation and harassment. Additionally, the media, which have assumed an important role of public diplomacy on violence, have been censored (to avoid negative press, the Chávez government prohibited the publication of images on violence) and have been threatened.

2.2.1. THE GOVERNMENT(S)

According to increasing homicide rates and recent opinion polls¹⁸, central government responses to urban violence have been inefficient. Political motivation is behind ambiguous attitudes towards crime which have long been tolerated by local authorities as part of the political project of President Chávez to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. In this sense, the creation, with Cuban support, of a series of so-called "Missions" (for example, education, health, housing and food) has helped to improve social data in Venezuela. Nonetheless, this has not yet had a visible impact on crime rates.

15 S. Gratius (2011). *The EU's Potential and Limits for Early Warning in Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela. Comparative case study of Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela*. IfP-EW: Brussels. Available at <http://www.ifp-ew.eu/pdf/20111111IfPEWUEUPotentialLimitsEWBolColVenez.pdf>

16 International Crisis Group (2011). 'Violencia política en Venezuela [Political violence in Venezuela]', *Informe sobre América Latina [Report on Latin America]* 38. Bogotá.

17 F. Jácome (2011). *Op. Cit.*

18 67 percent of citizens have not denounced a crime, believing that the authorities did not do anything against violence. INCOSEC (2011). *Estudio Violencia Interpersonal y Percepción de la Situación de Seguridad Ciudadana en Caracas 2010 [Interpersonal Violence Report and the Perception of the Situation of Citizens' Security in Caracas 2010]*. Caracas.

Other reasons for urban violence are institutional fragmentation and the lack of coordination between the different levels of governance in Venezuela's capital (the Metropolitan area, districts and *parroquias*). Caracas is the heart of pro- and anti-Chávez divisions in Venezuela and in fact has two governments. The elected Mayor, Antonio Ledezma, has been undermined due to the appointment of Jacqueline Farías (by Hugo Chávez) as the highest authority of the capital district. The power balance is clearly in favour of central government, which possesses the political and budget capacity to implement or veto any reform related to public security.

One urgently required reform is the prisons system, particularly in Caracas. The central government appointed a special Commission in 2004 and undertook a study on the situation in the prisons system (which included 52 Cuban specialists). In 2008, the Supreme Penitentiary Council launched, among other improvements, a Symphony Orchestra. Nonetheless, neither the plans to improve living conditions in national prisons nor to create nine new prisons in 2010 have been implemented. At the same time, no judicial reforms have been approved to overcome the high impunity rate.

The uncoordinated, understaffed, corrupt and repressive police in Caracas is part of the problem. One in five crimes in Venezuela can be attributed to the police. According to the 2008 report of the Attorney General, in the 2000-2007 period, the police executed more than 7,000 persons, and the security forces and the army committed more than 300 registered human rights violations¹⁹. Among the Latin American security forces, the Venezuelan police was evaluated the worst by citizens²⁰. A major problem is the decentralisation of public security: data provided by the local human rights organisation PROVEA reveal that, in Venezuela, 141 police units coexist and another ten are being established.

The central government has long ignored the problem and, according to some observers, reacted too late. Firstly, proposals for police reform were formulated in 2006 by the special commission CONAREPOL, which had been created for this task. In 2008, the central government approved a new police law aimed at integrating the different units into one system (by appointing a General Council of Police), promoting human rights and conflict prevention. In 2009, President Chávez created a National Council of Prevention and Citizens' Security and announced an integral plan of prevention and security. The latter task was carried out by the Minister of Justice and Domestic Policy, Tareck El Aissami, who pushed for police reform²¹.

The Policía Nacional Bolivariana [National Bolivarian Police] (PNB) is made up of 3000 policemen based in one of the most populated areas of the capital with high crime rates, Catia sector in the District of Libertador. These officials were recruited from the repressive Policía Metropolitana [Metropolitan Police] (PM), characterised by high levels of corruption and a strong record of violence. The main difference between the PM and the PNB is higher salaries and training courses on communitarian policing, as well as some training on human rights. To this end and to improve criminal investigations, the government inaugurated a Universidad Nacional Experimental de la Seguridad [National University of Security] (UNES) in Caracas in 2010.

At the same time, the Chávez government delegated some public security capacities to the Communitarian Councils created by the Bolivarian Revolution to empower local ownership in poor areas of the capital and other major cities in the country.

Apart from central government, local authorities in the state of Miranda (part of the capital district and governed by the opposition) have adopted some measures to improve police capacities for conflict prevention and resolution, such as special communitarian training or the creation of a special gender police wing. Nonetheless, according to interviews, police officers and communities complain about the lack of capacities and resources to implement further security sector reforms.

19 F. Jácome (2011). *Op. cit.*

20 Latinobarómetro (2011). 'LA DEMOCRACIA EN AMÉRICA LATINA [Democracy in Latin America]', accessed on 3rd December 2011. Available from <http://www.latinobarometro.org>

21 Consejo General de Policía (2011). *Gobernanza y gestión de la policía: Avances del nuevo modelo policial venezolano [Governance and management of the police: Progress of the new Venezuelan police model]*. Caracas.

Other voices criticised the initiatives taken by the central government (and Jacqueline Farías) for being insufficient, uncoordinated and short term, without any comprehensive strategy to tackle violence in all areas of Caracas. They also stressed that, despite some improvements, repression continued to dominate instead of early warning or conflict prevention in practice. Moreover, there is neither a plan to promote a culture of non-violence in the most dangerous districts of Caracas nor an integrated strategy to reform the justice system, to improve the conditions in prisons or to guarantee the investigation of crimes.

Budget cuts of 32.5% in 2011 have further reduced governmental responses²². Most resources have been spent to consolidate the PNB and the Communitarian Councils, the efficiency of which has not yet been proved²³. Some observers criticised its ideological identification with the president's Bolivarian project which is shared only by a proportion of citizens in the capital.

High levels of violence in all districts of the city and poor governmental responses have led to the privatisation of security: an estimated number of 700,000 private security agents are double the number of policemen in Caracas and further contribute to the spiral of violent conflict resolution. Apart from the privatisation of security, the lack of governmental responses has been partly compensated for by the increasing number of NGOs addressing citizens' security, crime and human rights.

2.2.2 NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Increasing homicide rates in Caracas are part of the political polarisation between government and opposition. The lack of dialogue between both camps impedes more efficient common solutions to increase public security. Different to Rio de Janeiro, there is no coordination between civil society and government.

With very few exceptions, governance and civil society responses to urban violence follow separate channels. Most small NGOs focused on human rights and public security are perceived by central government as a threat or part of the political opposition. Selective repression and harassment against some representatives of NGOs have further complicated relations between both actors.

Most of the NGOs focused on human rights and violence²⁴ have their offices in Caracas and limit their activities to the Venezuelan capital. Although some organisations had been involved in the recent police reform, most NGOs offer support to the victims of violence, for the publication of data and reports on crime, for education on human rights, for public debates on urban violence and for its possible solutions, as well as judicial suits on human rights violations. Since official figures on homicide and other crimes are not published, civil society organisations and the media in particular assume an important role in public diplomacy and the promotion of citizens' debates on urban violence.

Apart from threats and discrimination, due to legislative restrictions²⁵ imposed by the government, some organisations face serious financial and logistical restraints. Since they continue to assume an important role in the public denouncement of and pressure on governmental responses to urban violence, they are key for conflict prevention and early warning on urban violence. Their survival depends heavily on external funding.

Trends on urban violence and conflict prevention:

A recent police reform and other governmental responses to urban violence in Caracas have had limited impact. Increasing homicide rates in Caracas, despite social improvements, verify the need for further measures by local authorities and dialogue with civil society organisations on common approaches to security reform, orientated towards early warning and conflict prevention.

22 F. Jácome (2011). *Op. cit.*

23 *Ibid.*

24 For the list of NGOs specialised in public security, see F. Jácome (2011).

25 For more information on the restrictions to receive external funding imposed by the law for the defense of political sovereignty and national self-determination see: http://gaceta-oficial-venezuela.vlex.com/ve/vid/traspaso-presupuestarios-vivienda-habitat-37904321?ix_resultado=1.0&query%5Bq%5D=6.013#

2.3 EU PROJECTS

EU projects on human rights and public security are focused on supporting NGOs and local authorities. In the framework of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other instruments, the Delegation of the EU in Caracas finances several projects by local NGOs focused on public security, human rights, justice and prisons. Apart from those initiatives, some EU member States (the UK, Germany and Spain, among others) have offered some support for police training and other smaller projects in the broad field of public security.

Several human rights organisations, including PROVEA, benefited from EU resources to support projects focused on the victims of human rights violations or the reporting of the political situation in Venezuela. In the past, the Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones [Venezuelan Observatory of Prisons] (OVP) received funds for its annual report and assistance to people in prison. Although no particular project addressed the problem of urban violence in Caracas, the EU Delegation in Caracas also financed an NGO project on citizenship and human rights for young people in three districts in Caracas (Antímano, La Vega and Sucre in Libertador). Another project with important participation from metropolitan NGOs currently addresses the housing problem in poor areas of Caracas.

With regards to Official Development Assistance (ODA), channelled by the government, human rights and public security have not been included in the agenda, and public security is not included in the CSP. Despite several attempts to offer logistic and financial EU support for police reform in Caracas, there have been no official projects on public security and the special problem of urban violence. Given the complicated political situation and the reluctance of the government to accept external assistance and/or funds related to public security, the EU has a limited role in this field. The only project approved by the Venezuelan government (but not yet implemented) is DROGASTOP, aimed at the prevention and fight against illicit drugs. Nonetheless, the EU has the political will to do more if there were greater receptivity from local and central government.

3. (IN)SECURITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO

3.1. THE SITUATION

Rio de Janeiro has been traditionally considered one of the most violent states in Brazil. In the late 1990s Rio was ranked third among the most violent metropolitan regions in the country.²⁶ Homicide rates averaged 7,500 deaths per year – more than one third of them including persons between the ages of 15-24. The most common violent crimes are homicide, theft, and *autos de resistance* (death resulting from confrontation with the police). Large impoverished areas has led to more than 1000 *favelas*, 600 of them micro-*favelas*, situated on hilltops in nearly all districts of Rio de Janeiro. All of them are characterised by a lack of basic infrastructure, isolation and absence from local decision making²⁷.

Criminal organisations constitute a major concern for public security in Rio de Janeiro, especially because of their influence on *favelas* and poor neighbourhoods in the city.²⁸ The Western part of Rio de Janeiro, where institutional structures are particularly weak, has been traditionally dominated by drugs traffickers and/or paramilitaries (the so-called *milicias*). The largest criminal group, *Comando Vermelho*, operates in several *favelas*, among others the Complexo do Alemão, Mangueira, Jacarézinho or Cidade de Deus.

The situation began to change in the mid-2000s, when crime and homicide rates decreased. This was due to major investment in public security – a landmark was the creation of the *Delegacias Legais*, police stations with technological infrastructure and new policies to hold detainees. By 2006 crime rates had decreased significantly and two years later Rio de Janeiro was no longer the third but the fifth most violent city in Brazil. Youth violence also decreased and Rio moved from third (in the 1990s) to twentieth in the homicide ranking of people aged 15-24.²⁹ In 2010, Rio's homicide rate diminished to 1,628 or 27 per 100,000 inhabitants³⁰.

Specialists in public security and the media argue that this decrease was caused by three factors. The first was the new policies of public security implemented by State Governor Sergio Cabral Filho (2007-today, currently in his second term); the second is local government preparation for the Soccer World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016; the third factor was a certain manipulation of official statistics, which led to lower numbers, in order to increase property market values and raise investment in the city. Furthermore, reports published by the government and NGO are sometimes conflicting.


26 This ranking is based on the number of homicides and violent crimes. With regard to violence against people of between the ages of 15-24, Rio improved, moving from third place to twentieth out of 27 regions.

27 A. Morse (2011). 'Pacifying and Reincorporating Rio de Janeiro's Favelas' in *Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment*. WOLA: Washington DC.

28 Currently, there are three major groups acting in Rio: *Comando Vermelho* [Red Command], *Terceiro Comando* [Third Command], and *Amigos dos Amigos* [Friends of Friends], each of them controlling some regions of the city.

29 O Globo Rio (2011). 'UPPs reduziram homicídios em 38 bairros [UPPs reduced homicides in 38 districts]', accessed 27th November 2011. Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/UPP-reduziram-homicidios-em-38-bairros-3331252>; for further details on homicide rates, please refer to *Mapa da Violência 2011* available at <http://www.sangari.com/mapadaviolencia/#completo>

30 Due to the negligence of the Rio de Janeiro security authorities to provide statistics and the difficulties in finding reliable sources, reports are based on data from police stations and the Departments of Health and Justice.



(Source: http://espiritismoemdebate.com.br/paginas_do_site/enderecos/rio.html)

3.2. LOCAL RESPONSES

3.2.1. THE GOVERNMENT OF RIO DE JANEIRO

Similar to Caracas, governmental solutions to public insecurity in Rio de Janeiro are focused on the police and, to a minor extent, on social improvements. For several decades, when homicide rates reached record levels, local authorities addressed urban violence through reactive and repressive strategies, following the “troubleshooter model”. In these years, the fight against violence ended in confrontation between the state (represented by a repressive police force) and citizens (inhabitants of the *favelas*). Up until 2000, local politicians invested time and resources in overcoming criminal organisations by urbanising these regions, but the outcomes were not successful.

In recent years there has been a shift towards preventive policies and community policing which are now at the heart of the debate on public security in Rio de Janeiro. More than just a new strategy, current public policies reflect a change of perception from the fight against *favelas* to the provision of security and the integration of citizens into the city. The replacement of former models based on the war against crime is part of a broader political trend in Brazil towards the “universalisation” of human rights, including the poorest of the poor and the strengthening of the state. This policy has been implemented by both Presidents Lula da Silva (2002-2010) and his successor Dilma Rousseff (2011-present)

With regard to police reform, local authorities started the process in 2000, when they created the special area policing group GPAE, based on the experience of the Boston ceasefire programme³¹ to stop homicide victimisation among youth, inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model of problem-oriented policing (POP). The idea behind the initiative was to separate armed violence and drugs business from the territorial recovery of those urban areas dominated by criminal gangs. The project started in Rio's largest *favela* Complexo de Alemão. According to local interviewees, the GPAE initiative ended up unbalanced, with poor training, corruption and a short-term approach identified as the main constraints.

31 U.S. Department of Justice (2001). *Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's operation ceasefire*. National Institute of Justice: Boston.

Based on the experience of the GPAE, current State of Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio Cabral Filho and Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame developed a programme of public security to strengthen the presence of the state in areas formerly controlled by organised criminal gangs. In 2008, they established Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora [Peace Police Units] (UPPs). Since then, with the support of Rio de Janeiro's Mayor, Eduardo Paes, 19 UPPs were deployed in *favelas* and poor communities of the city, reaching approximately 280,000 inhabitants.³² UPPs are made up of 3,300 fresh recruits (not tainted by corruption). The main difference with other police brigades are the new recruits who receive a short (1- to 2-week) training course on human rights and communitarian work, and earn higher salaries as an incentive and vaccine against corruption. Local government will invest 15 million Reais³³ until 2016 to train 60,000 new police officers. As a complementary, socially-focused strategy, the government launched social UPPs in 2010 aimed at mapping and coordinating social services (by the government and NGOs) in *favelas*. Social UPPs have been implemented in 17 *favelas*.

This initiative was later adapted by central government and then served as a cornerstone of the federal Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania [National Programme of Public Security with Citizenship] (PRONASCI) to prevent urban violence and coordinate responses between the different levels of government. As of December 2011, Rio de Janeiro was the state with the highest level of participation in its projects. Among other activities, PRONASCI finances part of UPP costs³⁴. The most recent project (Rio Economia Solidária [Rio Solidarity Economy]), launched in December 2010, provides *favelas* with UPPs with a total budget of 8 million Reais to stimulate the local economy.³⁵ Although public security had been at the top of her electoral agenda, President Dilma Rousseff announced that she would not invest the total amount authorised by the federal budget in the PRONASCI projects. From a total of 2.1 billion Reais, only 1.25 billion would be invested in new or current projects. These budget cuts may affect the outcomes of current and future initiatives.

In order to reclaim areas from criminal organisations, UPPs involve both law-enforcement and social strategies. Following a military intervention by the Special Operations Battalion BOPE, UPPs have been installed in the *favelas* to prevent drug trafficking and illicit activities through intensive policing activities characterised by communitarian policing, including teaching young children and providing other services aimed at transforming the 'historically conflictive community-police-relationship'³⁶. The case of Rocinha – one of the biggest *favelas* located between the upper-class São Conrado and Gávea – which was occupied in November 2011 offers a good example. Police authorities publicised their intention to occupy Rocinha ten days before the occupation began. By doing so, they managed to prevent confrontation with criminal groups, and the police were able to capture members of these groups without shooting a single bullet. According to local authorities, the ongoing strategy is three-fold: firstly, to protect the citizens in *favelas* from violence (through a permanent UPP presence and close cooperation with citizens); secondly, to increase social and infrastructure programmes (a strategy that has been successful in São Paulo³⁷); thirdly, to gradually integrate (with private investment) *favelas* into the city.

Statistics published by the Instituto de Segurança Pública [Public Security Institute] (ISP) show that violent crime has fallen by impressive rates. Part of that success has been attributed to UPPs, which are considered the most successful security policy in recent decades to prevent and combat crime in Rio. From 2008-2010, violent crime levels sank by approximately 14 percent³⁸. However, as UPPs were implemented throughout the years 2008-2011, the gathering of data is neither uniform nor corresponds to the same period. Moreover, there is some variation in statistics presented by the report depending on the region of the city analysed. By and large, the number of homicides has decreased by 50 to 80 percent in regions with a UPP.³⁹ The success of the

32 For a complete list of all UPPs and implementation dates, please refer to <http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=261>

33 Approximately US\$8 million as of November 2011.

34 Pronasci (2007). 'Territórios de Paz [Peace Territories]', accessed 26th November 2011. Available at <http://portal.mj.gov.br/pronasci/data/Pages/MJ0FE4DE4EITEMID2243A2C2C46845AC8F1305685DD784D8PTBRNN.htm>

35 For further details please consult <http://portal.mj.gov.br/pronasci/data/Pages/MJA4C659C5ITEMID387C84DCC7E5446C97C2CE92DC93E6FFPTBRNN.htm>

36 A. Morse (2011). 'Pacifying and Reincorporating Rio de Janeiro's Favelas' in *Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment*. WOLA: Washington DC, p.4.

37 L. Tedesco (2009). 'Urban Violence: A Challenge to Institutional Strengthening: The Case of Latin America', *FRIDE Working Paper 78*. Madrid, p.11.

38 Rede Brasil Atual (2011). 'Quase três anos depois, UPPs no Rio seguem como obra em progresso [Almost three years later, in Rio UPPs follow as work in progress]', accessed on 23rd November 2011. Available at <http://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/temas/cidades/2011/08/unidades-de-policia-pacificadora-no-rj-uma-obra-em-progresso>

39 O Globo Rio (2011). 'UPPs reduziram homicídios em 38 bairros [UPPs reduced homicides in 38 districts]', accessed on 27th November 2011. Available at <http://oglobo.globo.com/rio/UPP-reduziram-homicidios-em-38-bairros-3331252>

programme has led to a current debate on a possible law on UPPs and their consolidation as a permanent “local peace mission”.

Despite the overall success of UPPs in reducing homicide and other violent crime rates, there are still some accusations of violent actions connected to the presence of the police in the *favelas*, such as the sexual harassment of female residents, bribery and corruption. Regarding these accusations, the police and political authorities are committed to investigating such events and to expel any police officer who engages in criminal activities. It is also important to highlight that if violent crimes have fallen in areas where UPPs were installed, outside those areas minor crime has increased. Specialists argue that UPPs have created a “security belt” around patrolled areas which has made criminals migrate to other areas, predominantly to nearby cities such as Macaé.⁴⁰ Moreover, many UPP officers had been part of the units of the (repressive and military) military police (PM). A clear constraint is the fact that special training courses for UPPs are limited to a maximum of one week and, in some cases, even 24 hours. Other critical voices stressed that there had been no coherent security strategy in Rio de Janeiro, but rather a short-term police operation in those *favelas* nearest the richest areas of the city. They insisted on the necessity to further increase public investment on basic infrastructure in all *favelas* of the city as well as offering programmes on education and training for young people. This would require a substantial increase of UPPs and social UPPs.

The recovery of the state's monopoly of violence has been at the heart of the government's recent policy on public security. Instead of creating a vicious circle of combating crime by military means and thus having higher levels of violence (particularly through previous monetary bonuses for “success” in the fight against crime), efforts in Rio are focused on ending violence. In this context, UPPs serve as permanent peace missions in the most prominent *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro. A second step will be the promotion of private and public investment in *favelas*. Part of this strategy is the promotion of “*favela*-tourism” and the creation of “communitarian banks” with their own local currencies (such as in the *Cidade de Deus favela*).

Despite some criticism, the evaluation of recent public policies, focused on prevention and the strengthening of the state, tend to be positive (83 percent of residents in *favelas* with UPPs found that the security situation has improved⁴¹) and reflect the political will of local authorities to reduce urban violence. In this sense, the UPPs are a mixed response between *mano dura* [firm hand/tough on crime], pacification, conflict prevention and social investment. Nonetheless, training (on human rights and social challenges) for UPPs is insufficient and should be improved, including early warning. This task could be addressed with the logistic, and eventually financial, support of the European Union, which has been actively involved in programmes to improve the social situation of *favelas* in close cooperation with local NGOs, but has not focused on police reform.

3.2.2. VIVA RIO AND CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES

Despite some differences on homicide statistics and social projects, local responses by NGOs and the government are closely intertwined in Rio de Janeiro. A clear example is Viva Rio, the most prominent NGO focused on urban violence in the metropolitan area. One of its main activities is a public campaign for arms control, another is education for youth, and a third is on the de-penalisation of some drugs, which is currently under debate in Brazil.

Viva Rio is closely following the monitoring the current UPP process in the central *favelas* of the city. The organisation counts on the participation of former police officers or members of the army with a critical insight, and who possess knowledge of the successes and constraints of recent police reforms and operations in *favelas*.

According to the governmental Instituto Pereira Passos [Pereira Passos Institute], responsible for Social UPPs⁴², there are a myriad of NGOs (approximately 200) active in *favelas*. Some of the most relevant NGO development projects in *favelas* are AfroReggae, VivaRio, VivaFavela, and Favela é Isso Aí. They implement projects in areas such as human rights, education, the provision of economic opportunities, access to the judiciary system, and health services.

40 Campanha Informativa da Violência Epidêmica (2011). ‘Macaé terá UPP. Não existe prova firme da “migração” do crime [Macaé will have UPP. There is no solid proof for the “migration” of crime]’, accessed on 21st November 2011. Available at <http://www.ipclfg.com.br/campanha-informativa-da-violencia-epidemica/macaé-tera-upp-nao-existe-prova-firme-da-“migracao”-do-crime>

41 A. Morse (2011). ‘Pacifying and Reincorporating Rio de Janeiro's Favelas’ in *Tackling Urban Violence in Latin America: Reversing Exclusion through Smart Policing and Social Investment*. WOLA: Washington DC, p. 5.

42 For further information please consult <http://www.uppsocial.com.br>

Although relations are not conflictive and public security is much less politicised than in Caracas, there is a certain competition between official entities and civil society responses. According to official criticism, any attempt to coordinate (on behalf of the government) independent projects is understood as interference in civil society. However, relations are close and both government and NGOs share consensus on the need to apply conflict-prevention policies to tackle urban violence.

Trends on urban violence and conflict prevention:

Thanks to the new UPP police units installed in some *favelas* and some socio-economic improvements, homicide rates have decreased and levels of violence diminished. Local authorities and NGOs share the political will and some visions on how to tackle urban violence through conflict-prevention policies and the integration of the slums into the city.

3.3. THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE EU

The EU Delegation in Brasilia offers a broad range of projects developed by the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU member states in the country. Nonetheless, public security or urban violence have not been identified as priorities for development assistance. According to the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) Brazil (2007-2013)⁴³, development assistance is concentrated on the exchange of know-how between Brazil and the EU and on environmental projects.⁴⁴

In the 2002-2006 period, only three projects were implemented in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro aimed at providing better conditions for poor people living in *favelas*. The main challenges faced were corruption and the unlawful use of public resources⁴⁵, citizens' limited access to the judiciary, and massive violations of human rights and abuses of power by law-enforcement authorities. According to the CSP⁴⁶, 'these projects focused mainly on improving the provision of basic social services [...] and promoting income-generating activities'.

In short, the CSP stresses social needs in *favelas* but does not focus on urban violence *per se*. One may infer that socio-economic development leads to lower levels of violence, but no explicit strategy has been drawn up for that field. A summary of 275 projects developed by the EU and its member states since 2002 in Brazil corroborates that argument.⁴⁷ Only Spain engaged in projects targeting relations between development and public security – mostly held in areas with indigenous people in northern and western regions – but none in Rio de Janeiro.

More recently, at their fifth Summit, held in October 2011 in Brussels, the EU and Brazil decided to strengthen dialogue on security matters⁴⁸. They agreed to improve the fight against organised crime, exchanges on best practices of law enforcement and the strengthening of bilateral legal and police cooperation. In this sense, the support of the UPP experience could be a good starting point to increase the EU's role in tackling urban violence. There is an urgent need to improve the UPP training process, either by supporting governmental policies or by special tenders for NGOs. Moreover, although the EU has not been present in the current process of improving public security in Rio de Janeiro, some lessons from local experiences with urban violence could be transferred to other countries (like Venezuela) where the EU has or should have a more prominent role in early warning and conflict prevention.

43 European Commission (2007). 'Brazil Country Strategy Paper', accessed on 17th November, 2011. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/brazil/csp/07_13_en.pdf

44 Another important document available is the Joint Action Plan and the Strategic Partnership, a letter of intentions elaborated for the 2nd EU-Brazil Summit in 2008. It states common goals and guidelines for the development of solid cooperation between the two parties and corroborates the information available in the CSP. The Portuguese version of the document is available at http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/seges/brasil_municipios/plano_acao.pdf

45 Brazil was ranked 69th out of 175 countries in the 2010 Transparency International ranking. For more information please consult http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results

46 European Commission (2007). 'Brazil Country Strategy Paper', accessed on 17th November 2011. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/brazil/csp/07_13_en.pdf

47 The summary provides a list of projects developed by the EU, Germany, Portugal, Spain, and France in Brazil. The projects of each country are listed in their native languages, except for Germany's, which have been written in Portuguese. For more information please consult http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/documents/projects/memberstatecooperation_en.pdf (last updated September 2011). Notwithstanding listing the projects developed since 2002, the summary does not provide any resources for a deeper comprehension of the nature of such initiatives.

48 Council of the EU (2011). 'V EU-Brazil Summit, Joint Statement, Brussels, 4 October 2011', accessed on 27th November 2011. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124878.pdf

4. TRIPARTITE COOPERATION ON URBAN VIOLENCE

4.1. LESSONS FROM CARACAS AND RIO DE JANEIRO

Today, Caracas's homicide rate is four times that of Rio de Janeiro. Crime statistics reflect an inverse trend in both cities: while public security has steadily improved in Rio de Janeiro, there has been a constant increase of urban violence in Caracas. Despite timely criticism and the still-limited impact of public security reforms, the case of Rio de Janeiro allows some lessons for in Caracas:

- firstly, police reform can be successful if repressive strategies are combined with communitarian policing in the poorest areas of the city;
- secondly, UPPs and social UPPs prove the need to combine and coordinate security sector reforms with social and (private and public) infrastructure programmes;
- thirdly, dialogue and cooperation between local governments and NGOs help to increase the efficiency of local responses to urban violence.

Despite high homicide rates, some positive experiences can also be drawn from the case of Caracas. Compared to Rio de Janeiro, where the inhabitants of *favelas* suffer from deep-rooted processes of discrimination and exclusion, local empowerment, political inclusion and (clientelist) social policies by the Chávez movement changed the nature of the slums of Caracas. Its inhabitants are no longer marginalised but have become political and social actors for the *causa Chavista*. Even the political opposition focuses on Caracas's poor, which both political camps have identified as a key group to win elections.

Given the social focus of President Chávez's political project, police reform in Caracas started in the most violent and less prosperous area of the city (Catia). Different to this experience, local observers offer criticism that police operations (including UPP) in Rio de Janeiro are focused on those urban areas dominated by the middle class (and tourism), while the poorest areas remain unattended.

In both cities, governmental responses to violence concentrate on immediate policies by focusing on the security sector. Fewer efforts have been dedicated to structural measures such as the reform of justice, the prison system or education⁴⁹. With regard to the latter, social UPPs in Rio de Janeiro and the missions in the poorest areas of Caracas⁵⁰ reflect the political will to address the social roots of the problem. If, in the case of Rio de Janeiro, social programmes are part of security policy, in Caracas, both follow separate channels where neither central nor local authorities have presented an integrated comprehensive strategy to address urban violence.

In Caracas and Rio de Janeiro, "institutional violence" through the existence of two parallel systems (for the rich and the poor), high levels of impunity, corruption, discrimination, difficult access to justice and dysfunctional prison systems with criminal structures are structural factors of urban violence. Neither Rio de Janeiro nor

49 For a deeper insights on law-enforcement and integral strategies on urban violence, please consult V. Felbab-Brown (2011). *Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America: Lessons for Law Enforcement and Policymakers*. Brookings Institute, December.

50 The missions were created by the Chávez government – with strong Cuban support – to address the social needs of the marginalised population. The most important are the medical *Barrio Adentro* and markets Mercal (subsidised food for the poor) programmes. These missions are aimed at increasing the presence of the government in traditional "state-free" zones of the city.

Caracas have made serious progress on necessary justice, education or penal reforms⁵¹ to tackle the causes of urban violence. While Caracas has long delayed the reforms and central government has shown little political will to implement them, local authorities in Rio de Janeiro are aware of the problems; however, improvements are hindered by wide-spread corruption and other institutional constraints.

The circulation of non-registered arms (9-15 million in the case of Caracas) is a problem in both cities which impedes an effective, long-term strategy against urban violence. In Brazil, the attempt (of the Lula government) to prohibit firearms by holding a referendum in 2005 did not succeed. No similar initiative has been taken in Venezuela, even though the disarmament of society and the strengthening of the state security sector is one of the principle demands of the political opposition⁵². Integral security reforms through addressing the police, the judicial and penal systems are absent in both cities.

Nonetheless, the decrease in homicide rates confirms that the public security record is more positive in Rio de Janeiro. The focus on conflict prevention and communitarian peacebuilding represents a new and positive change compared to traditional views on public security. The visible reduction of crime rates (according to official and NGO figures) proves a successful strategy of public security in the city's larger *favelas*. Despite the constraints in terms of training and resources, local communities consider UPPs as a useful strategy to reduce crime and drugs trafficking. Cooperation between the local government and NGOs can be considered as an advantage and a first step towards a general political consensus on how to integrate the *favelas* into the city and to marginalise criminal groups. The social part of UPPs, including major public and private investments and social infrastructure, should be particularly reinforced.

Compared with Rio, criminal rates in Caracas are higher than ever before, despite social improvements cited by the government. The latter confirms the hypothesis of civil society organisations that urban violence is not the result of high poverty rates and inequity but of combined factors that lead to a wide-spread "culture of violence". Therefore, urban violence represents a serious threat to both democracy and development.

4.2. TRIPARTITE COOPERATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU

According to the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)⁵³, 'smart policing and social investment' are the best responses to urban violence. Both solutions have been adopted, with differing success, by local authorities in Caracas and Rio de Janeiro. While UPPs and investment programmes in the *favelas* are key strategies in Rio, the Bolivarian police in Caracas and social missions in the poorest areas of the capital are major responses to urban violence in Venezuela.

The similar focus of local authorities in Caracas and Rio de Janeiro on tackling urban violence offers ground for an exchange of experiences with regards to communitarian policing (UPPs and PNB) and social improvements (social UPPs and missions). In both cases, European experience and financial support could lead to tripartite cooperation which would benefit all three parties.

As Laura Tedesco points out, '[t]he key to resolving urban violence is to reintegrate young people by strengthening institutions, creating consensus and increasing the resources dedicated to education, training, prevention and security'⁵⁴. In this sense, the socio-economic approach of the EU, as a strategy to promote democracy, citizenship and development, is crucial. Moreover, the EU and its member states have long-standing experience in both communitarian policing (like the British POP) and social policies.

For both cities, the EU's regional programme URB-AL, aimed at networking and the exchange of experiences between local urban communities in Latin America, offers a broad range of opportunities for further cooperation. Citizens' security is the most recent of the 13 networks created within the framework of URB-AL. Within this

51 Despite 18 reform initiatives of the penal code, Venezuela's prison system continues to be highly dysfunctional.

52 Unidad (2011). 'Para vivir y progresar en paz [To live and grow in peace]', accessed on 27th November 2011. Available at <http://www.unidadvenezuela.org>.

53 A. Morse (2011). *Op. cit.*

54 L. Tedesco (2009). 'Urban Violence: A Challenge to Institutional Strengthening: The Case of Latin America', *FRIDE Working Paper 78*. Madrid, p.14.

framework, the EU could initiate dialogue on urban violence and preventive policies with local authorities in Rio de Janeiro and Caracas. Apart from URB-AL, there should be a closer approach to local solutions at the municipal level in bilateral cooperation with Brazil and Venezuela, addressing both projects with local authorities and more support for non-governmental solutions to urban violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU

Regional (comparative) level:

- To explore the possibilities and limits for tripartite cooperation on public security and urban violence between Caracas and Rio de Janeiro under the auspices of the European Union;
- To strengthen the exchange of local responses on urban violence aimed at early warning and conflict prevention within the framework of URB-AL (particularly network 13 on public security);
- To improve the exchange of experiences of certain EU member states (particularly Spain, Italy and France) with Brazil and Venezuela on urban violence and communitarian policing including early warning.

Bilateral level (Brazil/Rio de Janeiro):

- To offer financial and logistic support for training and the long-term approach of the UPP community policing programme in Rio de Janeiro, including an early warning component;
- To increase bilateral cooperation on public security between Brazil and the EU (drugs trafficking, organised crime, policing) in the framework of the Strategic Partnership's recent action plan;
- To reactivate EU projects focused on social development in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro;
- To explore the possibility of transferring UPP experience to other Latin American cities (within the framework of URB-AL).

Bilateral level (Venezuela/Caracas):

- To include security concerns in the agenda of bilateral dialogue and cooperation with the Venezuelan government;
- To redesign the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) to place a greater emphasis on the causes and consequences of urban violence;
- To increase funding for NGOs addressing public security, youth and urban violence in Caracas;
- To insist on the EU's participation in police reforms implemented by central and local government in Caracas including early warning;
- To promote dialogue between government and NGOs on public security and urban violence to identify common solutions.

INITIATIVE FOR  PEACEBUILDING
EARLY WARNING

c/o International Alert
205 Rue Belliard, B-1040 Brussels Tel: +32 (0) 2 234 5792 Fax: +32 (0) 2 234 5799
ifp-ew@international-alert.org www.ifp-ew.eu



THIS INITIATIVE IS FUNDED
BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

PARTNERS

